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CRIMINAL

LAW-FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT-A SCHEME
WHEREBY FUNDS ARE WITHDRAWN FROM A FEDERALLY
INSURED BANK BY MEANS OF FORGED CHECKS
CONSTITUTES STEALING AND
PURLOINING WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE
FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY ACT

United States v. Simmons (1982)

*

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey found
Maurice Brown guilty of nine counts of stealing from federally insured banks
in violation of section 2113(b) of the Federal Bank Robbery Act (Act).'
Brown purchased blank corporate checks which had either been stolen or
written on a closed account. 2 Brown also obtained the originals or copies of
valid personal checks drawn on the accounts of third parties. 3 The corporate
checks were stamped with a check writing machine and information from
the valid checks was used to complete the payee's name, endorsement signature, and account number. 4 The checks would then be presented for payment at the banks where the valid personal accounts were maintained.Brown appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit 6 on the grounds that his actions constituted taking
* Editor'sNote: Since the writing of this note, the United States Supreme Court
has affirmed, in another case, the broad interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b)
advocated by the Third Circuit in Simmons. Bell v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 444
(1982).
1. United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1045 (3d Cir. 1982). Section
2113(b) of the Act provides in relevant part:
[W]hoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other things of value exceeding S 100 belonging to, or
in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit
union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1976).
In addition to the violations of § 2113(b), Brown and co-defendants, William
and Elizabeth Baucom, Mattie Simmons, and Anthony Bilotti were also charged
with and convicted of criminal conspiracy and interstate transportation of forged
checks. 679 F.2d at 1043. Evidence introduced at trial included fingerprints found
on various checks, bank teller's identification testimony, bank photographs showing
certain defendants cashing forged checks, and bank records of photocopied checks.
Id. at 1045.
2. 679 F.2d at 1043. The checks were purchased from either William Baucom, a
co-defendant, or Jennifer Straker, an unindicted co-conspirator. Id.
3. Id. Defendant Baucom or his wife, Elizabeth, who was then a bank teller,
supplied some of the checks. Id. at 1044.
4. Id.
5. Id. Brown drove co-conspirators to various banks on a regular basis to cash
the checks, and waited in the car while they went inside. Id.
6. Id. at 1045.

(786)
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money by "false pretenses" and were not within the ambit of section
2113(b), which proscribes "tak[ing] and carr[ying] away, with intent to steal
or purloin," money belonging to a federally insured bank.7 The Third Circuit 8 rejected Brown's contentions holding that the words "steal or purloin"
in the statute encompassed a scheme, such as Brown's, whereby funds were
removed from federally insured banks by means of forged checks. United
States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1982).
In 1934, Congress enacted the Federal Bank Robbery Act 9 in response
to then rampant gangster activities directed against federal banks' 0 and because of the territorial limitations of state jurisdiction over organized
crime. I I Although the original bill proscribed taking money or property
from a bank "by any trick, artifice, fraud, or false or fraudulent representation,"' 12 the bill as passed 13 encompassed only robbery.' 4 The Act was
7. Id. For the full text of§ 2113(b), see note 1 supra.
Brown committed the criminal act of obtaining property by false pretenses,
which at common law was defined as the "false representation of a material present
or past fact which causes the victim to pass title to his property to the wrongdoer who
knows his representation to be false and intends thereby to defraud the victim." W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 90, at 655 (1972).
8. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Sloviter and Adams and District Judge
VanArtsdalen, sitting by designation. Judge Sloviter delivered the opinion of the
court and Judge Adams wrote a brief concurring opinion.
9. Ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783 (1934) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976)). As
it was passed, the Act initially provided punishment for robbery of federal banks.
Prior to the Act, federal law protected banks against embezzlement only. See 12
U.S.C. § 592 (1935) (currently 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976)). The crimes of robbery, larceny and burglary against banks were only punishable under state law. Jerome v.
United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102 (1943). For a discussion of the legislative history of
the Act, see id. See also notes 10-17 and accompanying text infra.
10. On February 21, 1934, a bill "to provide punishment for certain offenses
committed against banks, organized or operating under laws of the United States, or
any member of the Federal Reserve System" was introduced in the Senate. 78 CONG.
REC. 2946-47 (1934). For the pertinent text of this bill, see note 12 thfra.
The Attorney General's letter which accompanied the initial proposals for the
Act identified the increase in gangster crimes against banks as the inducement for the
proposals. See S. REP. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); H. R. REP. No. 1461,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). See also 78 CONG. REC. 2947 (1934).
11. The Attorney General reported that due to the territorial limitation of their
jurisdiction, the states were not adequately able to control the crimes committed by
organized gangsters whose activities were not confined within any one state's boundaries. 78 CONG. REC. 2947 (1934). In his letter recommending the proposed legislation, the Attorney General noted that "the recent growth of certain types of crime
has brought forcefully to our attention the fact that criminals engaged therein are not
under adequate control [by the States] . . . . [T]he territorial limitations on their
[the States'] jurisdiction prevent them from adequately protecting their citizens from
this type of criminal." Id.
12. S. 2841, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 2946-47 (1934). Senate Bill
2841 contained five parts: section one defined the term "bank" for purposes of the
proposed legislation; section two made it a crime to take or attempt to take any
money or property from a bank without its consent, or with its consent obtained by
trick or artifice; sections three and four proscribed burglary and robbery of banks,
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amended in 19371 5 to include burglary and larceny 16 and made it a crime to
respectively; and section five prescribed harsher penalties under aggravated circumstances. Id.
Section two of S. 2841 provided:
Whoever, not being entitled to the possession of property or money or any
other thing of value belonging to, or in the care of, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, takes and carries away, such property
or money or an [sic] other thing of value from any place (1) without the
consent of such bank, or (2) with the consent of such bank obtained by the
offender by any trick, artifice, fraud, or false or fraudulent representation,
with intent to convert such property or money or any other thing of value
to his use or to the use of any individual, association, partnership, or corporation, other than such bank, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.
S. 2841, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 5738 (1934). Thus, §§ 2(1) and 2(2)
prohibited larceny and false pretenses, respectively. In his letter accompanying the
bill, the Attorney General explained that "[t]here would seem to be no logical reason
why the Federal Government should not protect the institutions in which it is interested from robbery by force and violence equally as well as from defalcation, embezzlement, and willful misapplication of funds." S. REP. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
1 (1934).
13. The bill passed the Senate and entered the House of Representatives accompanied by another letter of recommendation from the Attorney General to the House
Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. REP. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
The Attorney General's statement to the House Committee on the Judiciary incorporated much of the letter accompanying S. 2841, and noted that federal courts would
have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts. Id. The Attorney General emphasized the specific goal of S. 2841 to be that of eradicating criminal gangster activity,
and explained that "[tihe bill provides punishment for those who rob, burglarlze or
steal from such institutions [banks], or attempt so to do." Id. (emphasis added).
14. Without great discussion, the House amended the bill to delete sections two
and three, leaving only robbery within the ambit of proscription. H. R. REP. No.
1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). Robbery is generally defined as the "misappropriation of property under circumstances involving a danger to the person as well as
a danger to property." See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, supra note 7, § 94, at 692. Pursuant to the recommendations of the Conference Committee, the Senate receded from
its disagreement with the House and passed the bill on May 14, 1934. 78 CONG.
REC. 8776 (1934).
15. 81 CONG. REC. 5376 (1937). The amendment set maximum penalties for
each offense. The House passed the bill as amended on June 7, 1937. Id. at 5377.
Approximately two months later, on August 19, 1937, the Senate passed the
House version without change. Id. at 9331. The Senate Committee Report, submitted by Senator Ashurst, the original proponent of the 1934 Act, adopted the House
Committee's report and incorporated the Attorney General's letter. S. REP. No.
1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
16. H. R. 5900, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 CONG. REC. 2731 (1937). Only one
objection arose in the House: the bill appeared to put simple larceny on the same
plane as robbery or burglary. 81 CONG. REC. 4656, 5376-77 (1937). Larceny is generally defined as the trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal property of
another with the intent to steal. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 7, § 85, at 622.
Burglary is generally defined as a breaking and entering with intent to commit a
felony within. Id. § 96, at 708. For a definition of robbery, see note 14 supra. Representative Wolcott of Michigan objected that "a distinction should be made between
simple larceny within the building and robbery." 81 CONG. REC. at 4656. Representative Wolcott claimed that a man who robs a bank or who breaks into a bank at
night and commits larceny would be on the same plane as a man who walks into a
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"take and carry away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money
or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control,
17
management, or possession of any bank."'
All courts that have considered the issue agree that section 2113(b) of
the Act proscribes crimes which constitute common-law larceny,' 8 the essence of which requires a "taking of property from the possession of another
without his consent and with the intent permanently to deprive him of possession."' 9 However, courts have disagreed over the application of section
2113(b) to other theft crimes outside the sphere of common-law larceny because of the absence of a trespassory taking. 20 Some courts have held that
the "steal or purloin" language of the Act should be given a broad reading so
as to include the crimes of obtaining money by false pretenses and
2 1

embezzlement.

bank to make a deposit and picks up a pencil and leaves with it. Id. For this reason,
an amendment was proposed whereby H.R. 5900 distinguished grand from petit larceny on the basis of the value of "the property or money or any other thing of value"
taken and carried away. Id. at 5376.
17. H.R. 5900, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 CONG. REC. 5376 (1937). H.R. 5900
thus amended and supplemented the 1934 Bank Robbery Act by proscribing not
only robbery of a federal bank but also burglary and larceny. The Attorney General
recommended the proposed amendment and submitted a letter stating:
The fact that the statute is limited to robbery and does not include
larceny and burglary has led to some incongruous results. A striking instance arose a short time ago, when a man was arrested in a national bank
while walking out of the building with $11,000 of the bank's funds on his
person. He had managed to gain possession of the money during a momentary absence of one of the employees, without displaying any force or violence and without putting anyone in fear-necessary elements of the crime
of robbery-and was about to leave the bank when apprehended. As a
result, it was not practicable to prosecute him under any Federal statutes.
H.R. REP. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Guiffre, 576 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 833 (1978); LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967); Thaggard
v. United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966). For a
discussion of Guife, see notes 35-37 and accompanying text inra. For a discussion of
LeMasters, see notes 50-58 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Thaggard,
see notes 29-31 and accompanying text infra. See also United States v. Rogers, 289
F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961); notes 47-49 in/ia.
19. United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967) (larceny
covered by § 2113(b), while obtaining property by false pretenses was not). See notes
46-63 and accompanying text ihfna.
21. For cases advocating a broad interpretation of § 2113(b), see United States
v. Guiffre, 576 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (§ 2113(b) is
not limited to common-law larceny, but also applies to false pretenses). Accord United
States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1982) (Congress' use of the word "steal"
indicates § 2113(b) proscribes a broad area of conduct, including false pretenses);
United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982) (the act of nontrespassory taking
by deceit or false pretenses is prohibited by § 2113(b)); United States v. Fistel, 460
F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1972) (§ 2113(b) proscribes embezzlement and other takings with
intent to deprive the owner of use of property). Both Fistel and Guiffe relied primarily on United States o. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957) (broad interpretation of "stolen" in
National Motor Vehicles Theft Act). For further discussion regarding a broad inter-
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Although the United States Supreme Court has not determined the
scope of section 2113(b), it addressed a similar issue in United States v.
Tur/ey. 2 2 In Turley, the Supreme Court construed the term "stolen" in the
23
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (Dyer Act), to be synonymous with the
word "theft", which, the Court noted, was a term generally considered to be
broader than common-law larceny. 24 Though the legislative history of the
25
Dyer Act made no mention of theft or theft crimes other than larceny, the
Supreme Court theorized that Congress must have intended "steal" to be
synonymous with "theft" because it could not have meant to "leave loopholes for wholesale evasion." 26 The Court reasoned that "stolen" should be
27
noting
given a meaning consistent with the context in which it appears,
pretation of § 2113(b), see notes 22-45 and accompanying text infra. See also Annot.
46 A.L.R. FED. 841 (1980).
The Ninth, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits are the principal advocates of a narrow
United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.
interpretation of § 2113(b). See, e.g.,
1981) (legislative history of § 2113(b) indicates the statute is to be construed narrowly); LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967) (§ 2113(b) does not
cover obtaining money by false pretenses); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th
Cir. 1971) (words "steal and purloin" do not encompass embezzlement). See also
United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); United
States v. Mangus, 33 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ind. 1940).
22. 352 U.S. 407 (1957). The Turley defendant had transported an automobile
in interstate commerce knowing it to have been stolen. d. at 409.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976). This Act provided: "Whoever transports ininterstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been
stolen, shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both." The Turley Court had to decide whether "the meaning of the word 'stolen,'
.. .[was] limited to a taking which amounts to common-law larceny, or whether it
includes an embezzlement or other felonious taking with intent to deprive the owner
of the rights and benefits of ownership." 352 U.S. at 408.
24. 352 U.S. at 414. The Supreme Court briefly reviewed the legislative history
of the Dyer Act. Id. at 413-14. The House report entitled "Theft of Automobiles,"
pointed to the increasing number of automobile thefts and the inadequacy of state
laws to cope with the problem. Id. at 414 (citing H.R. REP. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1919). The Supreme Court noted that
[t]hroughout the legislative history Congress used the word "stolen" as synonymous with "theft" . . . . To be sure, the discussion referred to "lar-

ceny" but nothing was said about excluding other forms of "theft"....
No mention is made of a purpose to distinguish between different forms of
theft, as would be expected if the distinction has been intended.
Id. at 414-15 (footnotes omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 417 (footnotes omitted). The Turley Court recognized that professional thieves did not limit themselves to larceny. Id. at 416-17. Furthermore, the
Court deduced that if the Dyer Act were limited to crimes constituting larceny, the
statute's purpose of combating the interstate transportation of stolen automobiles
would be defeated. Id. at 417.
27. Id. at 412-13. The Court recognized the established rule of construction that
when a federal statute uses a common-law term the general practice is to give the
term its established common-law meaning. Id. at 411 (citing United States v. Carll,
105 U.S. 611 (1882); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); United
States v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944)). The Court decided that the
term "stolen" had no accepted common-law meaning. Id. at 411.
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that the term "was never at common law equated with or exclusively dedi28
cated to larceny."
Several of the Circuit Courts of Appeal have applied the Turley reasonFor example, in Thaggard V. United
ing to cases under section 2113(b).
29
States,
the defendant withdrew funds that the bank had erroneously
credited to his account. 30 The Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
rationale in Turley to find a violation of the Act on the ground that the words
"steal and purloin" did not act to limit the proscription of section 2113(b) to
common-law larceny. 3 1 Similarly, the Second, Seventh, and Eight Circuits
28. Id. at 411-12. The Turley Court stated that
while "stolen" is constantly identified with larceny, the term was never at
common law equated with or exclusively dedicated to larceny. "Steal"...
at first denoted in general usage [a] taking through secrecy, . . . or through
strategem. .

.

. Expanded through the years, it became

the generic

designation for dishonest acquisition, but it never lost its initial connotation. Nor in law is "steal" or "stolen" a word of art.
Id. (quoting Boone v. United States, 235 F.2d 939, 940 (4th Cir. 1956)). The Court
also relied on dictionary definitions. Id. at 412 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1953) (stolen: "[o]btained or accomplished by theft,
stealth, or craft.") and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) (steal: "may denote
the criminal taking of personal property either by larceny, embezzlement, or false
pretenses.")) See 352 U.S. at 412. Furthermore, the Court noted that other courts
have interpreted the term "stolen" or "steal" in other statutes and have found that
"they do not have a necessary common-law meaning coterminus with larceny and
exclusive of other theft crimes." Id. at 412 (footnote omitted).
The Turley dissent would have applied the principle of lenity to guide its construction of the Dyer Act. Id. at 417-18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
the dissent argued, if Congress had intended the Dyer Act "to sweep into the jurisdiction of the federal courts the transportation of cars obtained not only by theft but
also by trickery," it would very simply have expressed such an intent in the actual
language of the statute. Id.
29. 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. demed, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
30. Id. at 735-36. The court rejected the defendant's contention that to prove a
violation of § 2113(b), the prosecution had to establish the elements of common-law
larceny. Id. at 736-37. Accord Williams v. United States, 402 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.
1968).
31. 354 F.2d at 736. Relying on the Turley Court's analysis of the Dyer Act, the
Fifth Circuit emphasized the concept that "steal" as used in the Dyer Act embraced
"all felonious takings ... with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits
of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny."
Id. at 737 (quoting United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1956)).
Prior to Turley, the Fifth Circuit had construed a federal embezzlement statute
containing the words "steal or purloin" to cover cases as "may shade into larceny, as
well as any new situation which may arise under changing modern conditions and
not envisioned under the common law." Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir.
1938) (construing 11 U.S.C. § 100).
More recently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction under § 2113(b) where
the defendant's conduct constituted taking by false pretenses. See United States v.
Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1982). However, there was a strong dissent in Bell
advocating application of the rule of construction that ambiguity in a penal statute
should be resolved in favor of lenity. Id. at 551 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 995 (5th Cir. 1977)). The dissent stated that
"[t]he rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is, perhaps, not much less old
than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss3/15

6

Dohan: Criminal Law - Federal Bank Robbery Act - A Scheme Whereby Funds
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28: p. 786

have followed the Fifth Circuit's application of Turley and have broadly construed section 2113(b). 32 In United States v. Fistel,33 the Second Circuit held
that section 2113(b) covered "embezzlement by a bank official or employee
and other takings with intent to deprive the owner of permanent use of the
' 34
property taken."
In United States v. Guiffe,3' the Seventh Circuit relied on Turley, Thaggard, and Fistel to support a broad reading of section 2113(b) 36 and held that
37
obtaining money by false pretenses is within the ambit of section 2113(b).
38
Similarly, in United States v. Johnson the Eighth Circuit held that "larceny
by trick" (obtaining possession of money by false pretenses) was proscribed
individuals." Id. (quoting United States v. Boston & M.R.R., 380 U.S. 157, 160
(1965)). The dissent recognized that the doctrine of strict construction is subject to
the intention of the law-maker. 1d. (quoting United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988,
996 (5th Cir. 1977)). The dissent examined the LeMasters court's "painstaking
parsing of congressional intent," and criticized other circuit courts and the majority
in Bell, for not independently examining the legislative history of § 2113(b). Id. at
551-52 n.2 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (citing LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262
(9th Cir. 1967)). He stated that federal courts must assume "in the absence of a plain
indication to the contrary, that Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the
application of the federal act dependent on state law." Id. at 552 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)). The Bell dissent
would have distinguished Thaggard on the grounds that in Thaggard the defendant's
conduct constituted more than taking by false pretenses; it was conversion. Id. Furthermore, the dissent maintained that the language in Thaggard indicating that
"steal" included all felonious takings was only dicta. Id. For a discussion of LeMasters
v. United States, see notes 50-58 and accompanying text intfa.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Guiffre, 576 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 833 (1978);
United States v. Fistel, 460 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1972).
33. 460 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1972).
34. Id. at 163 (footnote omitted). Fistel was convicted of unlawful possession of
nine $100,000 United States Treasury Bills taken from a bank. The Court held that
the words "steal or purloin" in § 2113(b) covered embezzlement and were not limited
to larceny. Id. at 162-63.
In addition to the concept set forth in Turley that "stolen" should be given a
meaning consistent with its context, the Second Circuit relied on the construction it
had previously given to the phrase "with intent to steal or purloin" as used in the
Dyer Act in United States v. Handler, 142 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 741 (1944). The Handler court held the Dyer Act "applicable to any taking
whereby a person dishonestly obtains goods or securities belonging to another with
the intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership." Id.
35. 576 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
36. Id. at 128. Guiffre deposited stolen checks into a bank where he and his wife
maintained personal accounts and subsequently withdrew the money. Id. at 127. All
transactions were conducted with a teller who knew the checks were stolen. Id.
37. Id. at 127-28. The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in
Turley and on the Fifth and Second Circuits' decisions in Thaggard and Fistel, stating
that the "better construction of the words 'takes and carries away, with intent to steal
or purloin' " was the broad construction imposed by those courts. Id. at 128. For a
discussion of Turley, see notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
Thaggard, see notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
38. 575 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1978).
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by section 2113(b). 39 In UntiedStates v. Shoels, 40 the Tenth Circuit, while not
relying upon Turley, examined the available legislative history and the purpose of section 2113(b) 4 ' and found it to support the inclusion of the crime of
false pretenses within the ambit of the statute. 4 2 The Shoels court took notice
of the fact that Congress did not couch the statute in the language of larceny
43
but used the terms "steal or purloin" to describe the proscribed conduct.
This, concluded the Tenth Circuit, "[was] the best indication of the scope of
the Act." 4 4 The Shoels court reasoned that Congress intended to protect
"against theft crimes" by enacting section 2113(b) and that a broad con45
struction of the section would be consistent with that legislative intent.
However, not all courts have agreed with the rationales of Thaggard and
Shoels. The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that section 2113(b)
should be limited to crimes constituting larceny at common law. 46 The
39. Id. at 680. In Johnson, the defendant tricked the teller into giving him more
money than he ought to have received. Id. at 679. The court held that the offense
was proscribed by § 2113(b). Id. at 680. The Eighth Circuit relied upon Turley and
the Oxford English Dictionary, summarizing that "[t]he act of 'stealing' may encompass a wide range of dishonest acts whereby that belonging to another is expropriated, and it includes furtive or stealthy conduct or conduct that employs a trick or
artifice." Id. at 679.
40. 685 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1982). Defendant Shoels falsely identified himself as
the payee of a check and presented it for payment at the payee's bank. Id. at 381.
Shoels received cash and a courtesy check from the bank. Id. The named drawer,
Reynolds, had never written such a check and there was testimony implicating
Shoels in the burglary of Reynolds' house. Id.
41. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 2113(b), see notes 9-17 and
accompanying text, supra.
42. 685 F.2d at 383. The Tenth Circuit defined the crime of obtaining property
by false pretenses and distinguished it from "larceny by trick." The court stated that
the crime
include[s] the false representation by one who knows it to be false and made
with the intent to cause the victim to part with title to certain property, and
the victim so passes title to the person charged. The title aspect is a factor
to be considered in the context of this case. However, the possession versus
title distinctions have not proved to be of great assistance. The familiar
crime of "larceny by trick" is within the general definition of larceny and is
still no more than a form of larceny; that is, the trespassory taking of personal property with the intent to take it away permanently from the owner.
Id. at 382.
43. Id. at 383.
44. Id. The Tenth Circuit rejected the narrow definition given to the word "stolen" in the Dyer Act in a pre-Turley decision. See Hite v. United States, 168 F.2d 973
(10th Cir. 1948). In I-Ide, "steal" was defined as the common law offense of larceny.
Id. at 975.
45. 685 F.2d at 383. Acknowledging the paucity of legislative history, the Tenth
Circuit focused on the language of the statute, as well as its articulated purpose. Id.
Furthermore, the court pointed out that cases construing other federal statutes usually give the word "steal" a broader meaning than common law larceny. Id. (citing
United States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1978); Lyda v.
United States, 279 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1960); Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107 (5th
Cir. 1956); United States v.Handler, 142 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1944); Crabb v. Zerbst, 99
F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1938)).
46. See note 21 supra. See also notes 47-60 and accompanying text infra.
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Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Rogers, 47 held that section 2113(b) was coextensive with common law larceny and stated that the section did not reach
the crimes of embezzlement or obtaining property by false pretenses. 48 The
Rogers court relied upon the fact that the title of the 1937 amendment to the
Act expressly referred to larceny and upon the legislative history of the Act
49
in reaching its conclusion.
Similarly, in LeMasters v. United States, 50 the Ninth Circuit found the
language of section 2113(b) to be similar to that describing common-law
larceny and different from that delineating the crime of obtaining money by
false pretenses. 5 1 The court found additional support in the legislative his47. 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961). The defendant took the money knowing that a
bank teller had misread the date for the amount on the check. Id. at 434.
48. Id. at 437.
49. Id. The court accepted the defendant's premise that § 2113(b) reached only
common-law larceny. Id. Accord LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.
1967). The court relied upon the phrase in the statute "[w]hoever takes and carries
away, with intent to steal or purloin." 289 F.2d at 437. The court posited that this
phrase had been borrowed from a previous act which had been construed as a larceny statute. Id. at 437 n. 11 (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 16, 1 Stat. 116
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1976)). The Rogers court went on to state that,
upon retrial, if the defendant was found to have intended to appropriate the received
goods, then his conduct would constitute larceny in that the essential element of the
" 'felonious taking and carrying' away the personal goods of another," would be present. Id. at 438 (footnote omitted). The court explained that larceny constitutes an
invasion of another's right to possession and therein lies the principal distinction between larceny and embezzlement or false pretenses which the court found were not
covered by § 2113(h). Id. While the Rogers court adopted an expanded view of common law larceny it refused to expand § 2113(b) to cover false pretenses and embezzlement. Id. For a case applying Rogers' narrow interpretation of § 2113(b), see
United States v. Posner, 408 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Md. 1976), aft'd, 551 F.2d 310 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denid, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
The position advocated by the Fourth Circuit in Rogers is not necessarily consistent with a previous Fourth Circuit case construing the term "stolen" in the Dyer
Act. See Boone v. United States, 235 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1956). In Boone, the court
held that "stolen," as used in the Dyer Act, included obtaining property by false
pretenses, notwithstanding that the circumstances of procurement would not constitute common-law larceny. Id. In Turley, the Supreme Court drew from Boone the
proposition that "while 'stolen' is constantly identified with larceny, the term was
never at common law equated or exclusively dedicated to larceny." 352 U.S. 407,
411-12 (quoting Boone v. United States, 235 F.2d at 940). The Boone court looked to
the federal embezzlement statute which uses the term "stolen" to describe proscribed
conduct. 235 F.2d at 941 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 659). The court found that
"[c]ongressional intent is disclosed by the contemporaneous use of the same expression in a related statute." Id.
50. 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967). In LeMasters, the defendant extracted money
from another's bank account by presenting himself as that person to the bank teller.
Id. at 263.
51. Id. at 264. The court stated that the language of § 2113(b), "takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin" was similar to the language of common-law
larceny. Id. But cf. United States v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222, 230 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980) (mere use of phrase "takes and carries away" in federal
larceny statute does not indicate that the statute is per se limited to common-law
crime of larceny).
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tory of the statute for its conclusion that section 2113(b) applied only to
crimes constituting common-law larceny 5 2 in that a version of the bill specifically outlawing fraudulent activity failed to pass the Senate.5 3 In addition,
the Ninth Circuit argued that the crimes of false pretenses and embezzlement were, unlike larcenous crimes, adequately controlled by state law and
should therefore not be brought within federal criminal jurisdiction. 5 4 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that to read the language of the 1937 Act as referring only to larceny would be the logical interpretation since the language of
the statute would thereby be consistent with its title. 55 The Ninth Circuit
52. 378 F.2d at 264-68. But cf. United States v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. dented, 445 U.S. 918 (1980) (court reached holding contrary to LeMasters,
in interpreting statute using similar language).
53. 378 F.2d at 264-65. For a discussion of the Senate version, see notes 12-13
and accompanying text supra. For the House version, see notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1934 Act, see notes
9-17 and accompanying text supra.
The LeMasters court further supported its position by distinguishing Turley on
the grounds that the latter case construed the Dyer Act and was therefore not controlling in a case involving § 2113(b). 378 F.2d at 267. The court also cited the rule
of construction that ambiguities in penal codes should be construed in favor of the
accused. Id. at 268. See,e.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1954) (ambiguity in
a federal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity because it is not the role of the
courts to define criminal activity).
54. 378 F.2d at 266. With respect to this argument, the Ninth Circuit opined
that
[w]hen we remember that in 1934 Congress was unwilling to draw into the
orbit of a federal criminal law even burglary or taking without consent
from a bank, apparently because these crimes were adequately treated by
state law enforcement agencies and were not involved in interstate gangster
activities, it is hard to believe that in 1937 Congress was willing to involve
the United States in the multiplicitous bad check, forgery and other fraudulent transaction cases which occupy so much of the attention of local law
enforcement authorities but which, so far as appears, have no aspects of
interstate gangster activities, and which present no danger that state law
enforcement will be lacking in diligence.
Id. The 1937 Act, therefore, included only such larceny as was within the extended
scope of the 1934 Act and not that which was within the provisions deleted in 1934.
Id. at 264-65.
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the 1937 Act was not intended
to intrude upon state criminal law jurisdiction. Id. at 268. Since the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses was, according to the Ninth Circuit, adequately
dealt with under state law, the court claimed that extending federal criminal jurisdiction would only serve to confuse and dilute state responsibility for local crimes. Id.
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (absent clear statement of purpose
from Congress, the Court was unwilling to encroach on a traditional area of state
criminal jurisdiction by reading a federal statute broadly); Jerome v. United States,
318 U.S. 101 (1943) (courts should not extend a federal offense beyond terms of the
statute when the federal statute duplicates state law).
55. 378 F.2d at 265. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the title of the 1937
Act, "An Act to amend the bank robbery statute to include burglary and larceny,"
expressly referred to larceny. The court also noted that the crimes defined in the
1937 Act "looked remarkedly like the crimes of grand and petit larceny." Id. For
discussion of the 1937 amendment, see note 15 and accompanying text supra. The
Ninth Circuit referred to the clauses of the amendment which set harsher penalties
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refused to apply the Tur ey 5 6 reasoning, on the ground that the statute construed by the Turley court addressed the evil of interstate auto theft, an evil
which was the same whether larceny, false pretense or embezzlement occurred. 57 The court argued that such was not the case with respect to crimes
against banks proscribed by section 2113(b) which the court perceived as
58
being only directed at activities by interstate gangsters.

for larceny of property having a value greater than $50 and reasoned that to construe
the clauses as limited to larceny would render the substance of the statute consistent
with its title. 378 F.2d at 265.
Since LeMasters, the Ninth Circuit has sustained its position advocating a narrow
interpretation of § 2113(b). See United States v. Bennett, 399 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.
1968). In Bennett, the court concluded that the defendant's conduct constituted taking money by false pretenses and not common-law larceny and that, therefore,
§ 2113(b) was inapplicable. Id. at 744. However, the Bennett court did state that
[w]e come to this conclusion reluctantly, but we feel we are required to so
do (a) by the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), as carefully
researched in LeMasters .. . ; (b) by the specific holding in LeMasters . . .;
[and] (c) by the rules [of construction] enunciated by the Supreme Court of
the United States [inJerome v. United States] specifically related to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113.
Id. (citing LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967) and quoting
Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1942)).
56. 378 F.2d at 266-67 (citing United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1956)).
For a discussion of Turley, see notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra. In distinguishing Turley and the appellate decisions relying on it, the Ninth Circuit warned
against incorporating Turley's definition of "steal" to determine congressional intent
behind § 2113(b) because Congress in 1937 did not have the benefit of knowing how
the Supreme Court would construe "steal" in the Dyer Act. 378 F.2d at 266-67. The
Ninth Circuit pointed out that prior to Turley there was a conflict in appellate decisions as to whether "stolen" in the Dyer Act was intended to have a broad meaning.
Id. at 266. When Congress amended the Federal Bank Robbery Act in 1937 to
include burglary and larceny, "it could not have been relying upon any settled opinion that 'steal' included a variety of ways of dishonestly getting another person's
money. There was no settled opinion until 20 years later when the Turley opinion
came down." Id. at 266-67.
5?. Id. at 267. The LeMasters court noted that the same evil existed whether the
situation involved larceny, false pretenses or embezzlement, because the owner is deprived of his automobile and state law is ineffective in protecting him. Id. (quoting
Smith v. United States, 233 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1956)). Thus, the court reasoned
that Congress would have no reason to differentiate among the various theft crimes
in view of the Dyer Act's articulated purpose of preventing interstate auto theft. Id.
58. Id. at 267. According to the LeMasters court, the background and legislative
history of § 2113(b) was wholly different from that of the Dyer Act. Id. The court
stated, "We are aware of no background of evil at which Congress was pointing the
statute [§ 2113(b)] except the evil of interstate operation of gangster bank robbers."
Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging that the word "stolen" in the Dyer
Act was necessarily given a broad interpretation in light of the purpose of that statute, contended that since the legislative history, background, and purpose of
§ 2113(b) was different from that of the Dyer Act, the words "steal or purloin" in
§ 2113(b) could not be construed identically to "stolen" in the Dyer Act. Id. For a
discussion of the legislative purpose of § 2113(b), see notes 9-17 and accompanying
text supra.
According to the LeMasters court, the only remnant of Turley applicable to
§ 2113(b) was the mandate that "steal" be construed according to the context in
which it appeared. 378 F.2d at 267. Noting that "steal" appears with the phrase
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The Sixth Circuit concurred in the reasoning of LeMasters in United
States v. Feroni.59 The Feromi court criticized the courts of appeals following
Turley for construing section 2113(b) broadly without examining the statute's legislative history to determine the context in which it was enacted. 60
The Third Circuit previously addressed the interpretation of section
2113(b) in UnitedStates v. Pinto.6 ' The court held that Pinto, who knowingly
used funds erroneously credited to his corporation's bank account, was not
punishable under section 2113(b) and stated that "fraud-type offenses are
not contemplated by" the statute. 62 The Third Circuit explained that section 2113(b) could not apply to Pinto's conduct since "there was no 'taking
"takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin," the court pointed out that
the words "takes and carries away" are the classic words of common-law larceny, and
that the words "steal or purloin" are ambiguous because they do not have a common-law meaning. Id. To resolve the ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit looked to the
title of the 1937 Act, which expressly referred to larceny. The title, according to the
LeMasters court, stated the limited purpose of the statute and indicated the context
within which the word "steal" must be construed. Id. at 267-68. Thus, the court
found that both the taking and intent requirements of § 2113(b) were associated with
only larceny. Id. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's use of the statute's title
to resolve the ambiguity created by the words "steal or purloin," see note 55 and
accompanying text supra.
59. 655 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1981). In Feroni, the defendant was convicted of, inter
aha, bank larceny. Id. at 708. The prosecution conceded that the defendant's conduct did not constitute larceny because it lacked the essential element of a trespassory
taking, but rather amounted only to a taking by false pretenses. Id. The Feron" court
stated that LeMasters correctly determined the congressional intent behind § 2113(b),
as enacted in 1937. Id. at 709. The Sixth Circuit maintained that it could "do no
better than to quote from the thoughtful opinion of the Ninth Circuit" to show that

§ 2113(b) was not intended to address obtaining money by false pretenses. Id. at 710.
For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in LeMasters, see notes 50-58 and accompanying text supra. Without emphasizing the differences between the Dyer Act

and § 2113(b), the Sixth Circuit agreed with LeMasters that the relevance of the
Supreme Court's decision in Turley was limited to the conclusion that "steal" or "stolen" is unencumbered by common-law meanings, and should therefore be construed
in accordance with the context in which it appears. 655 F.2d at 710. From this the
Sixth Circuit deduced that "[i]t is clear that the [Supreme] Court contemplated that
'stolen' could have different meanings in different statutes." Id.
60. 655 F.2d at 710. The Sixth Circuit dismissed each of the decisions which
relied on Turley without independent analysis of the legislative history of § 2113(b),
as being "nothing more than a mechanical application of Turley ....
[T]hey fail to
apply the analysis which Turley prescribes." Id.
61. 646 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981), noted ih The
Third Circuit Review, 27 VILL. L. REV. 726 (1982). Pinto, as President of Pinto
Trucking Services (PTS), withdrew over $190,000 from his company's account with
the Philadelphia National Bank (PNB). Id. at 835. PNB had mistakenly credited the
PTS account with the money upon misreading a $193.51 remittance paid to PTS as
$193,511. Id. A PTS auditor reported to PNB that Pinto had assured him that PTS
had invoices indicating that PTS was owed $193,511. Id. Shortly thereafter, PTS
acknowledged that the remittance was a mistake and reimbursed the bank. Id.
62. Id. at 836. Without indicating whether larceny and taking by false pretenses
were included in the proscription of § 2113(b), the Third Circuit concluded that the
statute "does not include the transfer to the defendant's corporation of bank funds as
a result of a unilateral mistake of the bank, or the payment of such funds either to
defendant or to creditors of his corporation." Id.
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63

It was in light of these varying rationales that the Third Circuit consid-4
6
ered the issue of the scope of section 2113(b) in United States v. Simmons.
Writing for the majority of the court, Judge Sloviter cited Guife, Fistel, and
Thaggard as support for the court's rejection of a narrow construction of section 2113(b). 65 Noting that these decisions relied primarily on UnitedStates V.
Turley, the Third Circuit explained that, in Turley, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the meanings of the terms "stolen" and "steal"
were limited to the meaning associated with common-law larceny. 6 6 The
majority observed that the Turley Court had relied on dictionary definitions
of "steal" and "stolen" to give these terms broader scope and held that they
did not have a meaning "coterminous with larceny and exclusive of other
theft crimes."

67

The Third Circuit then turned to an examination of the legislative history of section 2113(b) and noted that the Act, as initially enacted in 1934,
did not contain the provisions of the bill approved by the Senate which proscribed burglary and taking money or property by trick, artifice, fraud or
fraudulent representation. 68 While recognizing that the 1934 legislation was
designed to check "organized groups of gangsters," ' 69 the Simmons court
63. Id. (citing LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 264 (9th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 1961)).
The Third Circuit also noted that "where Congress is creating offenses which
duplicate or build upon state law, courts should be reluctant to expand the defined
offenses beyond the clear requirements of the terms of the statute." Id. (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105 (1943)). For an in-depth analysis of Pito,
see Note, FederalBank Robbery Act-A Withdrawal of Funds Which Have Been Credited to a
Bank Account Due to the UnilateralMistake of a Bank is a Fraud-Type Offense and not Larceny,
27 VILL. L. REV. 726 (1982).

64. 679 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1982).
65. Id. at 1045. For a discussion of Guiffre, see notes 35-37 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of Fistel, see notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Thaggard, see notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
In Simmons, defendant Brown argued that the evidence of criminal activity
before the jury would sustain only a finding of the crime of false pretenses which is
not encompassed by the "steal or purloin" language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). 679 F.2d
at 1045.
66. 679 F.2d at 1045. For a detailed discussion of Turley, see notes 22-28 and
accompanying text supra.
67. 679 F.2d at 1045-46 (quoting United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. at 412-13).
The Simmons court stated:
"[S]tolen" and "steal" have been used in federal criminal statutes, and the
courts interpreting those words have declared that they do not have a necessary common-law meaning coterminus with larceny and exclusive of other
theft crimes. Freed from a common-law meaning, we should give "stolen"
the meaning consistent with the context in which it appears.
Id. at 1046 (quoting United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. at 412-13 (footnote omitted)).
68. Id. The House amendment deleted the provisions that would have brought
burglary and larceny within the scope of the Act. Id. (citing 78 CONG. REC. 8132-33
(1934)). See note 14 and accompanying text supra for the pertinent legislative history.
69. 679 F.2d at 1046 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 2947 (1934)). The Simmons court
relied upon the letters of the Attorney General to support its interpretation of Con-
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found that when Congress amended the Act "[t]here [was] no indication in
the 1937 legislative history that three years after the passage of the original
statute, Congress' concern was limited to gangster activities." 7 ° On the contrary, the Third Circuit determined that the fact that the 1937 Act contained language almost identical to that deleted from the 1934 Act
manifested Congress' intent to expand the scope of the statute's proscriptions. 7 1 In addition, while the Third Circuit advised the exercise of caution
in using subsequent legislative actions to delineate the intent of a previous
Congress, it considered subsequent amendments to section 2113(b) as supportive of a broad construction of the statute. 72 For these reasons the Third
Circuit concluded that Congress' concern had evolved beyond the "gangsterism" referred to in the legislative history of the 1934 Act and was directed
"at least in part to the federal government's potential obligation as an insurer to reimburse various financial institutions if they were to become victims of offenses covered by section 2113." 73 The Simmons court next
gressional intent. Id. For the text of the Attorney General's letters, see notes 10-13 &
17 supra.

70. 679 F.2d at 1047-48. The 1937 Act was entitled "AN ACT To amend the
bank-robbery statute to include burglary and larceny." Id. H.R. 5900, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., 81 CONG. REC. 2731 (1937). It introduced the "steal or purloin" intent
requirement of the present § 2113(b). Id. at 1047. See notes 15-17 and accompanying
text supra. Primarily, the distinction discerned by the Third Circuit lay in the fact
that the 1934 Act articulated a purpose and expressly addressed the specific area of
gangster crimes, whereas the 1937 Act did not. 679 F.2d at 1047-48.
71. 679 F.2d at 1048. The court remarked that the Attorney General's letter,
incorporated into the 1937 House report, indicated that Congress' concern was no
longer limited to gangster activities. Id. at 1047-48 (citing H.R. REP. No. 732, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937)). For a discussion of the Attorney General's letter, see note
17 supra.

72. 679 F.2d at 1048. In 1940, Congress again amended the Bank Robbery Act
to include provisions making it a crime to "receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell,
or dispose of any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have
been taken from a bank in violation of [the other provisions of the federal bank robbery act]." Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 455, 54 Stat. 695 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(c)). In 1950, Congress amended § 2113 to include federally insured "savings
and loan associations." Act of August 3, 1950, ch. 516, 64 Stat. 394. The meaning of
"savings and loan association" was later supplemented to incorporate building and
loan associations, homestead associations, and state cooperative banks insured by the
FSLIC. Act of April 8, 1952, ch. 164, 66 Stat. 46. See S. REP. No. 898, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-3 (1951). Federal credit unions were included in 1959. Act of September 22,
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-354, § 2, 73 Stat. 628, 639. Federally insured credit unions
became protected in 1970. Act of October 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468, § 8, 84 Stat.
994, 1017.
73. 679 F.2d at 1048. The Third Circuit noted that Congress did not express an

intent behind the 1937 amendment. Id. The court found that the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion as to legislative intent was not compelling, stating that "it is just as reason-

able to conjecture that at that time Congress may have decided that language expressly referring to fraud, artifice and false pretenses in § 2113 might presage a
narrow interpretation of other criminal statutes using the words "steal or purloin."
Id. The Third Circuit found support in the fact that the Ninth Circuit itself had
construed the language in 18 U.S.C. § 661, which is similar to that in § 2113(b), as
not limited to offenses constituting common-law larceny. 679 F.2d at 1048. See
United States v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222, 231 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918
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dispelled any potential anxiety regarding a broad expansion of federal jurisdiction in criminal law by reasoning that "when the underlying offense affects federally insured money or property, Congress has a legitimate concern
in exercising its jurisdiction to outlaw conduct such as that found to have
74
occurred in this case."
The court then turned to and distinguished its prior holding in Plnto by
limiting that case strictly to its facts. In Pinto, the transfer of funds resulted
from a bank's unilateral mistake and "there was no 'taking away' of funds
from either bank in a trespassory way." 75 This was quite different, the Third
Circuit stated, from "an ongoing and comprehensive scheme to withdraw
'7 6
funds from a series of banks through forged checks."
It is submitted that the Third Circuit correctly determined the congressional intent behind the 1937 amendments to the Federal Bank Robbery
Act. 77 As the Simmons court noted, subsequent amendments to the Act evidenced a congressional intent to expand the scope of the Act beyond protection of banks against interstate gangster activity. 78 For example, the
impetus behind the 1937 amendment appears to have been the concern of
(1980). For a discussion of Maloney, see note 51 supra. Because the statute on its face
did not limit the words "steal and purloin," the Third Circuit believed the language
"should be given a construction consistent with that given similar statutory language
by the Supreme Court in the Turley case." 679 F.2d at 1048.
74. 679 F.2d at 1048-49 (citing McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642 (1982)).
The Third Circuit observed that the McElroy Court had not seemed concerned about
the expansion of federal criminal law jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court instead
focused on the language of the statute before it. Id. The McElroy Court stated that
"[ajlthough a change of [statutory] language is some evidence of a change of purpose,
.. .the inference of a change of intent is only a 'workable rule of construction, not
an infallible guide to legislative intent, and cannot overcome more persuasive evidence.' " 455 U.S. 651 n.14 (citations omitted). The Third Circuit noted that the
McElroy Court found the absence of limiting language on the face of a statute and
the broad purpose articulated in the legislative history of a statute to be more persuasive evidence. 670 F.2d at 1048 (citing McElroy v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 1332,
1336-39 (1982)).
75. 679 F.2d at 1048 (quoting United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 823, 836 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981)). The Simmons court stated that any language
in Pinto indicating that § 2113(b) should be given a restrictive construction was at
most dictum. Id. For a discussion of the Pinto decision, see notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
76. 679 F.2d at 1049. In addition, the Simmons court noted that the Pinto opinion itself "stated that the facts before it were 'factually quite different' from those
cases where the 'bank funds taken and carried away were drawn out of a bank
through various fraudulent schemes.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Pinto, 757 F.2d
833, 837 (1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981)).
Judge Adams concurred with the majority in a short opinion which stressed that
Pinto was factually distinguishable from Simmons. 679 F.2d at 1051 (Adams, J., concurring). He wrote separately to emphasize that Pinto should be overruled at the first
opportunity, finding it to present a strained interpretation of § 2113(b) which would
lead to minute and unsatisfying distinctions between cases. Id.
77. For a discussion of the legislative history behind the 1937 amendment to the
Act, see notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
78. The minimum evil sought to be eradicated by the Act was that addressed by
the 1934 Act, namely, crimes perpetrated by gangster organizations. See notes 9-15
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the Attorney General over the inadequacy of the 1934 Act. 79 It would appear reasonable to conclude that by 1937, the Attorney General had shifted
his concern from the punishment of gangster activity to the protection of
banks within the Federal Reserve system and those insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. 80 The effect of theft on a bank is the same
regardless of the method of taking: whether by larceny, embezzlement, or
false pretenses."'
The initial impetus behind the Federal Bank Robbery Act was the inadequacy of state law in combatting interstate crime by gangsters.8 2 Initially,
and accompanying text supra. Both the Third and Ninth Circuits, among others,
agree that this was the evil addressed by the 1934 Bank Robbery Act.
In 1940, Congress again amended the Act to make it a federal crime to "receive,
possess, conceal, store, barter, sell or dispose of any property or money or other thing
of value knowing the same to have been taken from a bank in violation of [other
provisions of the Act]." Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 455, 54 Stat. 695 (1940) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2113(c)). Since the 1950's, Congress has amended § 2113 to expand the
scope of the institutions within its provisions to include, among others, savings and
loan associations and credit unions. See note 72 supra.
79. 679 F.2d at 1047. The Third Circuit believed that the Attorney General's
letter which was made a part of the House Report on the 1937 Amendments indicated that Congress' concern was no longer limited to gangster activities. Id. at 104748 (citing H.R. REP. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937)). For the text of the
Attorney General's letter, see note 17 supra.
80. See S. REP. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). The Attorney General's 1934 Letter, incorporated into the Senate Report on the initial proposals for the
Act, specifically identified gangster crimes as the inducement for the Act. S. REP.
No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). For a discussion of the Attorney General's
1934 letter, see note 10 and accompanying text supra. In 1937, however, the Attorney
General spoke only in terms of protecting federal banks against crime and did not
restrict his comments to crimes committed by gangsters. H.R. REP. No. 732, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). For the text and discussion of the Attorney General's
1937 letter, see note 17 and accompanying text supra.
81. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1937 amendment to the Act
which supports the conclusion that other crimes have as deleterious an effect on
banks as robbery, see note 17 and accompanying text supra.
The reasoning that a bank is ultimately deprived of its property regardless of the
form of the crime is similar to that engaged in by the Supreme Court in Turley. In
Turley, the Court concluded that the evil addressed by the Dyer Act was the same
whether larceny, false pretenses or embezzlement was involved because in any case
the owner is deprived of his vehicle. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413-14
(1956). For further discussion of this aspect of Turley, see notes 23-26 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
82. See notes 84-89 and accompanying text infra. See also note 11 for the Attorney General's assertion of the inability of states to combat such crimes as to the reason for the 1934 Act. While the facts giving rise to the 1934 Act were undoubtedly
the rapid growth of gangster crimes, congressional statements regarding the 1937
amendment were devoid of any mention of gangster activity. Regarding the 1934
Act, see S. REP. No. 537, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also 78 CONG. REC. 2946-47
(1934). These two documents are discussed in notes 11-14 and accompanying text
supra. Regarding the 1937 Amendment, see H.R. REP. No. 732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1937). See also S. REP. No. 1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). For a discussion of these documents, see notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
The 1934 Act provided federal protection to federal banks because state laws,
due to their limited jurisdiction within state boundaries, were inadequate means for
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Congress chose only to address bank robbery, which was the classic "gangster type" crime.8 3 However, it soon became obvious that this statute did not
provide sufficient protection against bank robbery and presumably state law
was also inadequate to deal with other theft crimes, such as larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses, at least when practiced on an interstate basis.8 4
As the Third Circuit recognized, to effectuate the purpose of protecting federal banks (or federally insured banks), artificial distinctions should not be
85
drawn among these crimes.
The Third Circuit relied to a great extent on the Turley Court's interpretation of "stolen" in the Dyer Act to supply both the contextual and definitional meaning of "steal" in section 2113(b), 86 recognizing the Turley Court's
mandate to construe "steal" in the context in which it appears. 87 The "context" in which a phrase of a statute appears is logically both the legislative
history and the full text of the statute. 88 Given the Third Circuit's conclusion that the "context" of this language was that of protecting banks, rather
than the more limited purpose posited by the LeMasters court of combatting
gangsterism, it seems reasonable for the court to have adopted the Turley
Court's broad definition of steal.8 9
In its analysis, the Third Circuit focused primarily on the "steal and
purloin" language and not the "takes and carries away" language of section
effecting this end. See 78 CONG. REC. 2946-47 (1934), discussed in notes 10-12 and
accompanying text supra. See also note 81 and accompanying text supra. At the time
of the 1937 amendment, no legislative expression negated this concern as a focus of
the 1937 enactment. For a discussion of this history, see notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
84. For a discussion of the differences among these crimes, see notes 14, 16 & 42
supra. In light of the articulated purpose of § 2113(b) to protect federal banks, it is
asserted that the government's interest is the same regardless of the form of the crime.
It is asserted that the inadequacy of state laws in punishing the criminal who transgresses state borders was the same whether robbery, larceny, or false pretenses was
the crime.
85. See 679 F.2d at 1048.
86. Id. at 1045-46. In Turley, the Supreme Court explained that "stolen," while
constantly identified with larceny, was never at common law exclusively defined as
larceny. The Turley court also relied on dictionary definitions of "stolen" which likewise did not restrict its meaning to larceny. 352 U.S. at 411-12. For further discussion of the Turley court's definition of "stolen" in the Dyer Act, see notes 22-28 and
accompanying text supra.
87. 679 F.2d at 1046 (quoting United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 412-13
(1957)). See note 67 supra for the full text of the Turley quote.
88. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. at 413. The Turley court stated that
since "stolen" was to be given a meaning consistent with its context, it was therefore
"appropriate to consider the purpose of the [Dyer] Act and to gain what light we can
from its legislative history." Id.
89. See 679 F.2d at 1045-46. While the Third Circuit recognized that the principal of lenity has no application in the absence of ambiguity, the court admitted that
the word "steal" has no common-law meaning and that it should be interpreted in
context, thereby implying that the term is ambiguous. Id. at 1046-49.
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2113(b). 9 0 Although the latter phrase is, as the LeMasters court recognized,
one traditionally associated with common law larceny, 9 ' at common law,
such phrase was never combined with the words steal and purloin. Thus the
rule of construction that words with an accepted common law meaning
should be given that meaning when used in a statute, would not seem
9 2

applicable.

Admittedly, Congress' use of the word larceny in the title and the meager legislative history leave some room for doubt as to Congress' true intent
behind this statutory language. 93 This is clearly evidenced by the conflicting
decisions of the courts of appeals. 94 The Smmons interpretation of the congressional intent is certainly a reasonable interpretation of the available evidence and on policy grounds appears more satisfactory and efficacious than
an interpretation which allows artificial and unsatisfactory distinctions between crimes. Despite the rule of construction that a federal statute should
not be interpreted in such a way as to infringe upon areas traditionally
within the jurisdiction of the states, Congress would certainly have a legitimate concern in exercising its jurisdiction to outlaw the conduct which occurred in Simmons and in aiding the states. 95
90. For the juxtaposition of these clauses in the text of § 2113(b), see note 1
supra. The Third Circuit rarely mentioned the "takes and carries away" language of
§ 2113(b). See 679 F.2d at 1045-48. Nor did the Third Circuit construe this language
in its prior § 2113(b) decision in United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833 (1981), cert.
deni'ed, 454 U.S. 816 (1981).
91. See LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d at 267. For a discussion of this
aspect of LeMasters, see note 58 and accompanying text supra.
92. See 352 U.S. at 411 (while a common law term in a federal statute must be
given its common law meaning, "stolen" has no common law meaning).
93. The 1937 Act was entitled "An Act to amend the bank robbery statute to
include burglary and larceny." 81 CONG. REC. 2731 (1937). The Ninth Circuit contended that the fact that the word "larceny" appeared in the title to the Act, indicated that the 1937 Act was intended to cover only larceny and not all that was
deleted from the 1934 proposals for the Act. LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d at
264-65. For further discussion of the LeMasters court's reasoning, see notes 55 & 58
and accompanying text supra.
94. For a list of these cases, see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note I supra. The Third Circuit referred only briefly to the principle of
lenity and the concept that federal criminal jurisdiction should not be expanded into
an area traditionally covered by state law. 679 F.2d at 1048. In reference to the
latter, the court relied on the Supreme Court's rejection of this principle in broadly
construing a federal statute in McElroy v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 1332 (1982). See
679 F.2d at 1048. For a discussion of McElroy, see note 74 supra.
Prior to Simmons, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Pinto, stated that the

double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment does not bar federal prosecution of
a criminal even though the defendant has already been convicted by a state court for
the same acts. The Court further explained that additional weight must therefore be
given "to the view that where Congress is creating offenses which duplicate or build
upon state law, courts should be reluctant to expand the defined offenses beyond the
clear requirements of the terms of the statute." 646 F.2d 833 (1981), cert. dented, 454
U.S. 816 (1981) (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943)).
For an explanation of the rules of construction used to aid a court in construing
a penal statute, see United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (federal criminal statute should not be read in a way that would encroach on a traditional area of state
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In United States v. Simmons, the Third Circuit has admirably advocated a
definitive construction of section 2113(b). 96 It has minimized the importance of distinctions between the crimes of larceny and false pretenses. 97 After this case, negotiating forged checks constitutes a crime punishable under
section 2113(b). 98 The decision makes certain the scope of section 2113(b)
which was left open by Pinto. Pinto, however, would still appear to be good
law at least when a bank is initially responsible for the transfer which results
in the ultimate taking of its property.99 However, the nature of the statute
itself, and of its legislative history, is such that until the Supreme Court provides a definitive resolution of the issue currently dividing the courts of appeals the punishment a criminal receives for the same conduct in a different
circuit will inequitably vary. 1°°
Ju/a M. Dohan
criminal jurisdiction, absent a clear indication by Congress that such a construction
was intended). See also LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967)
(principle of lenity); McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642 (1982) (change in statutory language implies a change of congressional interest).
96. For the Third Circuit's analysis and construction, see notes 65-74 and accompanying text supra. See also 679 F.2d at 1049. For the other cases advocating the
same position, see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
97. 679 F.2d at 1048. In addition, it is asserted that it was Congress' intent to
protect banks against crimes regardless of their form and that the focus of the 1937
enactment was to minimize the differences between larceny and false pretenses so
that banks may be further protected. See notes 79-85 and accompanying text supra.
98. 679 F.2d at 1048.
99. For a discussion of Pinto, see notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
100. Compare United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1981); LeMasters v.
United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967); and United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d
433 (4th Cir. 1961) with United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Guiffre,
576 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Fistel, 460 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1972);
and Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965),cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958
(1966).
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